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Abstract
Recently I posted a paper entitled “External observer reflections on
QBism”. As any external observable, I was not able to reflect some fea-
tures of QBism properly. Therefore comments which I received from
one of its creators, C. Fuchs, are very valuable - to understand better
the views of QBists. Some of QBism features are very delicate and to
extract them from articles of QBists is not a simple task. Therefore
I hope that the second portion of my reflection on QBism (or better
to say my reflections on Fuchs’ reflections on my reflections) might
be interesting and useful for other experts in quantum foundations
and quantum information theory (especially by taking into account
my previous aggressively anti-QBism position). In the present paper I
correct some of my previously posted critical comments on QBism. At
the same time better understanding of QBists views on some problems
leads to improvement and strengthening of other critical comments.
1 Introduction
The main aim of this note is to represent my reflections on reflections of C.
Fuchs (private comments via email) on my recent reflections on QBism [1].
However, it is useful to start with a general discussion about interpretations
of quantum mechanics (QM) and QBism [2]-[15] as one of them. Besides such
basic interpretations as the Copenhagen, nonlocal, and many worlds inter-
pretations, QBism will be often compared with the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation [16],
[17]. The latter is not so well popularized. However, its use as a comparative
illustration is justified by two things: a) it was born (in 2001) as a realist
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answer to QBism (see [3] for QBism’s reply); b) its essence (as well as in
QBism) is treatment of QM as a machinery for assignment of probabilities.
We start with the Copenhagen interpretation which is still the basic and
commonly accepted interpretation. By it QM provides an epistemic descrip-
tion of micro-phenomena, i.e., results of observations, and moreover a finer
description than given by QM is impossible. The latter is completeness of
QM from Bohr’s perspective [18]. For him [19], [20] (see also [21], [22]) com-
pleteness of QM is not a consequence of some “no-go theorems” such as,
e.g., von Neumann [23] or Bell [24] theorems, but of the existence of the
indivisible quant of action given by the Planck constant h. The Copenhagen
interpretation is totally consistent and it serves quantum physics already 80
years.
However, the essential part of the quantum community is not completely
satisfied by Bohr’s perspective (even those who use the Copenhagen inter-
pretation as the daily routine). Theoreticians are not happy to recognize
that their only task is to develop the operational quantum structures which
is important for applications, but definitely boring. Surprisingly even some
experimenters are unhappy. (What can they want besides the operational
interpretation of QM?) Some of them, as, e.g., A. Zeilinger (in cooperation
with C. Brukner), are looking for some fundamental information-processing
principle behind QM [25], [26] . Others (and it seems they are numerous) are
not happy to study surrogates of features of quantum systems and their own
measurement devices (and the last years even their own free wills). They
want reality! They want to measure properties of quantum systems. This
situation of very general dissatisfaction by the old Copenhagen perspective
led to flowering of very exotic interpretations of QM - so exotic that the
fathers of QM are spinning in their graves. I mean nonlocal interpretations
of QM1 and the many worlds interpretation.
Quantum Bayesianism (QBism) [2]-[15] is also considered as one of exotic
interpretations, surprisingly as even more exotic than the two aforementioned
interpretations. Why? May be because QBism is a non-realistic interpreta-
tion? However, the Copenhagen interpretation is non-realistic as well... It
1In fact, there are two sorts of “quantum nonlocality”. One of them is the ontic
nonlocaty - nonlocal hidden variables. It is rooted from Bohmian mechanics. However,
what is very interesting and not easy to explain, majority of people saying about quantum
nonlocality have in mind the epistemic nonlocality - nonlocality of standard QM. They say:
there exists spooky action at a distance; this is exhibition of “quantum nonlocality”. The
latter viewpoint has to be treated as a new interpretation of QM - the quantum nonlocality
interpretation, although people presenting such a nonlocal viewpoint consider themselves
as followers of the Copenhagen interpretation. However, Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli, Landau,
and Fock definitely would not support the nonlocal interpretation of QM.
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seems that the main problem is that QBism refers to the irreducible role of
a mental element in decision making about the outcomes of quantum experi-
ments. And an average modern physicist is sure that in physics there is no
place for mental elements. This position is a consequence of deep separation
between cognition and psychology from one side and physics from another.
(We remind that in 19th century and at the beginning of 20th century this
separation was not so deep [27].)
Can a mental element be peacefully incorporated in the body of QM?
For a moment, the answer is “may be”. On one hand, we can mention the
supporting views of Pauli (and his correspondence with Jung), Whitehead,
and Wigner. On the other hand, we can again point to the rise of physical
realism in the form of Bohmian mechanics, many world interpretation and
the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation [16], [17] (although all these “realisms” are quite
exotic, respectively: nonlocal2, many worlds, contextual3) and attempts to
exclude completely the mental element from quantum foundations.
Roughly speaking one can select between the operational, nonlocal, many
worlds, contextual and subjective interpretations of QM. However, the pres-
ence of a mental element in decision making (in our case about probabilities
of experimental outcomes) is essentially less mystical than, e.g., spooky ac-
tion at a distance. In particular, this argument was presented by T. Ha¨nsch
in his talk at the Va¨xjo¨-2015 conference in which he explained why he ac-
cepts QBism as the most natural and useful interpretation of QM, especially
in the light of the quantum information revolution.
Initially my own position was characterized by the strong anti-QBsm at-
titude. I was not happy with the subjective interpretation [31] of quantum
probabilities which I treated as objective [32], [33]. And the Va¨xjo¨ inter-
pretation was created as a realist (but contextual) answer to QBism [16].
However, QBism and the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation have one important common
thing: both treat QM as a formalism for prediction of probabilities. And this
is the essence of the formalism, i.e., not just a supplement. The difference
is that in one case probabilities are interpreted as subjective and in another
case as objective. Both interpretations recognize the fundamental role of the
Born rule. This rule is the cornerstone of QM and the rest of the quantum
formalism, including entanglement, is just a supplement. Moreover, both
interpretations treat this rule as a quantum generalization of the law of total
2The main problem is not even Bohm-like nonlocality at the level of hidden variables,
ontic nonlocality, but “quantum nonlocality” resulting from spooky action at a distance.
3In the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation [28] contextuality is treated more generally than in mod-
ern discussions on contextuality of QM. Context is a complex of experimental physical
conditions for measurement of some observable(s), cf. with the approach developed by P.
Grangier [29], [30].
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probability.4
Can one accept the use of mental elements in physics? My viewpoint to
this problem changed crucially after reading Schro¨dinger’s book [37] which
can be treated as an attempt of the mental structuring of thermodynamics,
classical and quantum. Schro¨dinger advertised the Gibbs approach to ther-
modynamics based on the use of virtual ensembles composed of mental copies
of a single system.5 However, in Schro¨dinger’s representation the Gibb’s
construction is even more subjective than in the original Gibbs writings.
Moreover, Schro¨dinger applied the same mental picture to derive quantum
statistics. Hence, it seems that there is just one step to QBism?
Schro¨dinger did not claim that the mental representation approach is
identical to the real physical situation. However, he advertised this approach,
because it is simpler than Boltzmann “physical approach” and leads to the
same answers! Why not to accept QBism by similar reason? 6
2 My reflections on Fuchs’ reflections on my
reflections on QBism
QBism is characterized by C. Fuchs and R. Schack [11], pp. 3-4, as follows:
“The fundamental primitive of QBism is the concept of experience. According to
QBism, quantum mechanics is a theory that any agent can use to evaluate her expec-
tations for the content of her personal experience. ... An agent’s beliefs and experiences
are necessarily local to that agent. This implies that the question of nonlocality simply does
not arise in QBism.”
4There is also a fundamental mathematical difference. The Born rule based formula of
total probability (FTP) has very different mathematical forms which do not match each
other; see [8]-[11] for the QBist version and [34]-[36], [28] for the Va¨xjo¨ version.
5I used this book to adapt the quantum formalism to applications to social science, a
model of social laser [38].
6And I can do this without to give up the Va¨xjo¨ approach which can be considered
as the quantum analog of the Boltzmann physical approach. Schro¨dinger did not say
that Boltzmann was wrong ... Another reason for my recent movement towards QBism is
my active research in applications of quantum probability in cognition, psychology [27].
Here we need an interpretation of QM which is free from the spooky action at a distance
and other quantum exotics. I used the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation, but the realist contextual
modeling of cognition is too big challenge. Therefore it is very pragmatic to use QBism
[39]. We have decision makers, they assign subjective probabilities. Moreover, the latter
are widely used in decision making not only in psychological studies, but in engineering,
military actions, politics, economics. Engineers use subjective probability. Why physicists
cannot?
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2.1 QBism is not a neo-Copenhagen interpretation
The viewpoint that QBism is a modern version of the Copenhagen interpre-
tation is quite common. Therefore it is important to emphasize that this
viewpoint is wrong. In [1] this problem was discussed and the position of
QBists was illustrated by citation from Mermin’s paper [14], , p. 7-8:
“A fundamental difference between QBism and any flavor of Copenhagen, is that
QBism explicitly introduces each user of quantum mechanics into the story, together with
the world external to that user. Since every user is different, dividing the world differently
into external and internal, every application of quantum mechanics to the world must ul-
timately refer, if only implicitly, to a particular user. But every version of Copenhagen
takes a view of the world that makes no reference to the particular user who is trying to
make sense of that world.”
Thus the main difference is the private agent perspective to outcomes
of experiments which is absent in the Copenhagen interpretation. At the
same time initially C. Fuchs was influenced deeply by Pauli’s version of the
Copenhagen interpretation. However, to be consistent, QBism cannot re-
strict its mental component to Pauli’s objective registering apparatus, the results of
which are objectively available for anyone’s inspection. Private agent’s experience is
the cornerstone of QBism [7].
2.2 CBism or even SBism?
In [1] it was emphasized coupling of QBism to de Finetti’s subjective ex-
perience methodology of science [40]. In particular, it was claimed: “Finally
we point that de Finetti was even more revolutionary than QBists, because his subjective
treatment of scientific method was not restricted to special quantum world’. [T]hey were
not brave enough to declare the private agent perspective for knowledge about classical
world as well.”
This claim is a consequence of my lack of education. QBists were concen-
trated on QM simply because it has the most severe interpretational problems
which had to be solved to proceed successfully towards quantum information
technologies. However, they recognized from the very beginning that the
power of the subjective perspective approach can be used as well in clas-
sical statistical mechanics and in physics in general, moreover even outside
of physics (precisely as de Finetti stated). In particular, in 2003 C. Fuchs
pointed out (see, e.g., [13], p. 812).
Since becoming immersed in the subject, I have found nothing more exciting than these
trains of thought. For they indicate the extent to which quantum foundations research
may be the tip of an icebergindeed, something with the potential to drastically change our
worldview, even outside the realm of physical practice.
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Thus QBism is just a part of de Finetti’s SBism (where ‘S’ is from ‘Sci-
ence’). Another good source on interrelation of QBism and CBism (the latter
is about the private agent perspective for classical physics) is Mermin’s paper
[15]. We stress that in this paper the mental dimension is especially strong.
2.3 Born’s rule as generalization of the formula of total
probability
As was mentioned in introduction, QBists treat Born’s rule as quantum gen-
eralization of FTP. We remind that classical FTP functionally connects the
probability distribution of one observable, say A, with probability distri-
bution of another observable, say B, by using the conditional probabilities
p(B|A) :
p(bj) = f(p(ai), p(bj|ai)), (1)
where
f(x, y) =
∑
i
xiyj. (2)
By considering two quantum observables, e.g., given by POVMs, we can
represent the Born rule as a similar transformation. It is important to remark
that even in classical case we can find a variety of functional representations
(1). The form (2) of the function f is in some sense the best adapted to the
Bayes formula for classical conditional probability. Hence, in the quantum
case we also can construct a variety of the functional representations of the
form (1). QBists selected one special form of f coupled to so called SIC-
POVMs.
In [1] I was very critical to “addiction” of QBists to such special POVMs.
From my viewpoint, it would be natural at least to start with an arbitrary
informationally compelte POVM. “However, for QBists the above generalization to
start the probability update scheme with an arbitrary POVM measurement and not with the
SIC-POVM seems to be unacceptable. They are really addicted on SIC-POVMs and on
completeness of information gained at the first step, information about the state, even at
the price of appearance of counterfactuals,” [1]. In his comments C. Fuchs motivates
the use of the SIC-POVM FTP representation of the Born rule as encoding as
much unique Hilbert space structure into the Born rule as possible. It seems that QBists
hope to obtain QM from this SIC-POVM FTP. And this is an exciting, but
very challenging project!
The SIC-POVM FTP is the basic axiom of QBism. What is it proba-
bilistic meaning?
In [1] I interpreted SIC-POVM FTP as the quantum rule for probability
update (PU). This matches generalized classical PU known as Jeffrey’s con-
ditioning [41], [42]. This my viewpoint on SIC-POVM FTP resulted from my
misunderstanding of the basic principle of QBism and exploring the analogy
with the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation, where the quantum FTP (so to say, two ar-
bitrary POVMs FTP) is interpreted as the quantum analog of Jeffrey’s PU.
This is the delicate issue and we start the discussion from reminding the
classical PU and its generalization - Jeffrey’s PU.
2.4 Classical Bayesian probability update
The probability of a hypothesis H conditional on a collected data E is given
Bayes’ formula - the definition of conditional probability:
p(H|E) = p(H&E)/p(E), p(E) > 0. (3)
Bayes’ Theorem relates the “direct” probability of a hypothesis conditional
on the data, p(H|E), to the “inverse” probability of the data conditional on
the hypothesis, p(E|H).
p(H|E) = [p(H)/p(E)]p(E|H), (4)
This possibility to “invert” probability p(H|E), is based on commutativity
of the operation of conjunction in Boolean logic: H&E = E&H. Of course,
the definition of conditional probability by Bayes’ formula is possible only
under this condition.
Subjectivists think of learning as a process of belief revision in which a
prior subjective probability p is replaced by a posterior probability q that in-
corporates newly acquired information. This process proceeds in two stages.
First, some of the subject’s probabilities are directly altered by experience,
intuition, memory, or some other non-inferential learning process. Second,
the subject “updates” the rest of her opinions to bring them into line with
her newly acquired knowledge.
Simple Conditioning. If a person with a prior such that 0 < p(E) < 1
has a learning experience whose sole immediate effect is to raise her subjective
probability for E to 1, then her post-learning posterior for any proposition
H should be
p(H) = p(H|E). (5)
Though useful as an ideal, simple conditioning is not widely applicable
because it requires the learner to become absolutely certain of E’s truth.
As R. Jeffrey has argued [41], [42] the evidence we receive is often sufficient
only to assign some probabilities to occurrence of E. Here the direct effect
of a learning experience will be to alter the subjective probability of some
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proposition without raising it to 1 or lowering it to 0. Experiences of this sort
are appropriately modeled by what has come to be called Jeffrey conditioning.
Jeffrey Conditioning. If a person has a learning experience whose sole
immediate effect is to change her subjective probability for E to p(E), then
her post-learning posterior for any H should be given by FTP:
p(H) = p(E)p(H|E) + (1− p(E))p(H|E), (6)
where, for any proposition F, the symbol F denotes negation of the proposi-
tion F. Obviously, Jeffrey conditioning reduces to simple conditioning when
p(E) = 1. Jeffrey conditioning can be generalized to the case of a collec-
tion of hypotheses and pieces of data represented mathematically as the
disjoint partitions of the space of elementary events Ω, (Hj) and (Ei), where
Hi&Hj = ∅, Ei&Ej = ∅, i 6= j :
p(Hj) =
∑
i
p(Ei)p(Hj|Ei). (7)
For further considerations, it is useful to represent Jeffrey’s PU in terms of
two observables, A and B : the events Ei correspond to observations of the
values ai of A and the hypotheses Hj are about (possible) observations of
the values bj of B. Then the PU rule (7) coincides with FTP (1), (2).
In the pure subjective probability approach all probabilities in the right-
hand side of (7) are treated as subjective. However, in classical PU it is quite
common to use mixed subjective-objective PU. Here the probabilities p(Ei)
are considered as subjective, but the conditional probabilities p(Hj|Ei) as
objective. (In the observational notations they have the form p(bj |ai).) The
latter probabilities were collected, e.g., by using frequencies of observations of
the hypotheses Hj on the basis of events Ei. These are “structural constants”
of the update. Soon we shall discuss these interpretations of PU given by (7)
in the quantum framework.
2.5 SIC-POVM formula of total probability and prob-
ability update
Jeffrey’s PU can practically automatically generalized to the quantum case
by using POVMs representation of observables A and B and the definition of
quantum conditional probability. There is a quantum state ρ. The informa-
tion about it is updated as the result of A-measurement, i.e., in general we
do not try to reconstruct ρ completely, but we are fine by knowing just the
information gained from the A-measurement. (Of course, sometimes we can
be lucky and be able to perform information-complete measurement.) On the
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basis of this information and by knowing probabilities gained from sequen-
tial measurements, first A and then B, we make PU of probabilities for the
possible values of the B-observable. In this way a quantum analog of FTP
is interpreted in the Va¨xjo¨ framework [34]-[36], [28]. Here all probabilities
are interpreted objectively. However, there is nothing wrong to proceed with
subjective probabilities, especially in the framework of subjective-objective
PU. In the very important case of the observable A of von Neumann-Lu¨ders
type having nondegenerate spectrum, the conditional (or better to say tran-
sition) probabilities p(bj |ai) do not depend on the state ρ. It is natural to
consider them as objectively determined “structural constants”.
In [1] this viewpoint on quantum versions of FTP, as generalized PU, was
extrapolated to QBism with subjective interpretation of probabilities as its
main specialty, as well as the special SIC-POVM form of FTP:
p(bj) =
∑
i
(
(d+ 1)p(ai)−
1
d
)
p(bj |ai), (8)
where d is the dimension of the state space.
However, it happens that such extrapolation was not justified and this
is real misunderstanding of QBism’s interpretation of the quantum FTP (in
their SIC-POVM form). QBists do not consider SIC-POVM FTP as a gen-
eralization of classical Jeffrey’s PU . Their interpretation is more delicate [9].
Here I prefer to cite C. Fuchs (email correspondence): “I understand what the
FTP is, but I would never call it a machine for updating probabilities. When I think of
“updating probabilities” the kind of apparatus that comes to mind is, for instance, an appli-
cation of Bayes rule for conditionalizing, or Jeffreys conditionalization rule, etc. That is,
“updating” is about changing probabilities upon the acquisition of new information. But
the FTP is not about updating in that sense. Rather QBism views it as a “coherence”
statement in the sense of de Finetti’s Dutch book argument. That is, it is a relation be-
tween probability assignments, all defined at the same time (i.e., synchronically). It is
not about the “changing of probabilities,” but about how various assignments should fit
together to start with. Similarly, this is how we think of the Born Rule when viewed as a
modified FTP: It as a specification for how various probabilities defined at one time should
fit together. It is not about the changing of probabilities when information is acquired.”
We also present another of Fuchs’ communications clarifying this viewpoint:
[W]e think of it [the SIC-POVM FTP] as a synchronic coherence requirement (much
like a Dutch book argument for the FTP, which is purely synchronic). Its role is to say
that an agent should NOT let his probability assignment for the outcomes of a given exper-
iment fly free from the assignments he would make in a hypothetical (or counterfactual)
experiment involving an intermediate SIC. The assignments should be related even though
not both experiments can be performed at the same time. See also section 4 [11] for
detail.
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The aforementioned synchronization of probabilities is purely subjective;
even conditional probabilities (as the quantum state assignment), else QBism
would be inconsistent. It is important to remark that QBism as any interpre-
tation of QM evolves and have some flavors7; in the “old QBism” of Caves,
Fuchs, and Schack the state and the conditional probabilities were treated
objectively! We can refer to sections 7 and 8 of [2].
2.6 Quantum Bayesian agents
In [1] it was pointed out , “It is important that QBism uses this rule as an information
constraint to determine a class of so to say ‘quantum agents’, i.e., those who ‘get tickets
to the QBism performance.’ Thus private users of QM are those who know the main rule
of the game. And this matches completely QBism. The idea is that QM is
something used only by a privileged class of people. Those educated in the
methods of QM are able to make better decisions (because of certain basic
features of nature) than those not educated in the methods of QM.
However, the attempt [1] to introduce into QBism, so to say, the “univer-
sal quantum Bayesian agent”, in the spirit of Brukner [43] (who wrote about
the “hypothetical agent”), are not welcome in QBism - experience has to be
really private.
3 Understanding QBism
We now summarize our discussion on distinguishing and delicate features of
QBism:
1. QBism is about private experience of agents making predictions about
outcomes of experiments. The sample of agents is not arbitrary. A
QBism agent has to belong to so to say “quantum club”, i.e., to be
“quantumly educated.”
2. The paradigm of the “universal quantum Bayesian agent” is totally
foreign to QBism.
3. It is the natural further step from exploring mental structures in sta-
tistical physics and thermodynamics - technique of calculation of prob-
abilities based on invention of virtual ensembles (Gibbs, Schro¨dinger,
Jaynes). The use of such ensembles composed of mental copies of a
7This is not the feature of only QBism. The same can be said about, e.g., the Copen-
hagen interpretation, A. Plotnitsky even invented the terminology “interpretation in the
spirit of Copenhagen” [21], [22].
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single system naturally leads to the subjective interpretation of proba-
bilities.
4. It matches well with scientific methodology presented by de Finettei in
his great pamphlet “Probabilismo” [40]. By this methodology science is
about our private experiences. QBists understand well that QBism is a
part of so to say SBism, where “S” is for science. In particular, CBism
(where “C” from classical physics) was discussed in very details by D.
Mermin. S. Fuchs started his pathway to QBism from subjective treat-
ment of classical thermodynamics in the spirit of 1). Concentration
on QBism is explained by real necessity to solve the interpretational
problems of QM in the light of the quantum information revolution.
5. QBism is a local interpretation of QM.
6. Is QBism a non-realist interpretation of QM? It is a complicated philo-
sophic issue. It seems that for subjectivists (both classical, as de
Finetti, and quantum) the reality is constructed from our private ex-
periences. From this viewpoint they are realists.
7. QBism is not a version of Copenhagen interpretation, although it was
rooted in it.
8. By QBism the quantum formalism is a machinery for consistent assign-
ment of subjective probabilities for outputs of possible experiment.
9. This probability synchronization machinery cannot be simply treated
as a kind of probability update machinery.8
10. The Born rule is treated as the main axiom of QM, other axioms are
just supplement.
11. This rule is represented in the form of generalized law of total proba-
bility SIC POVM FTP.9
12. The use of SIC POVMs is crucial, since QBists hope that SIC POVM
FTP encodes all basic features of QM.
8This is the main difference between QBism and the Va¨xjo¨ interpretation of QM (more
fundamental than the difference in the interpretation of probabilities).
9This quantum analog of FTP differs crucially from the Va¨xjo¨ version of quantum FTP
(which is an additive perturbation of classical FTP).
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13. For consistency of QBism all probabilities in SIC POVM FTP have to
be interpreted as subjective probabilities, even conditional probabilities
p(bj |ai).
10
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